The Smug Style in American Liberalism: How Did We Get There?

My son Mike has been posting some very wise and perceptive pieces on Facebook. Six days ago, he pointed people to this Vox article by Emmett Reisin, entitled "The Smug Style in American Liberalism."

Here is Mike’s introduction to it:

“To my fellow liberals/progressives: Bookmark this essay, which was published back in April. Place a reminder note on your calendar for, say, a week or two from now, once the election shock has worn off and the initial anger has run its course, to read this essay in full. You won't enjoy it. It was emotionally painful for me to get through. But it's such an important reference point as we collectively begin the journey of extricating ourselves from the political crisis we now find ourselves in.”

I just read it, and I agree with most of what is said. It should be read when you have the time to read and think about it. 

I have a few additional comments:

This dynamic has been going on since the mid-1960s, when our society's attempt to grapple with our racial past came at the same time when world economic changes began to threaten the newfound stability of America's white working class. These economic changes have been accelerating with each passing decade. Our inability to deal with these economic changes led, more than anything else, to the result in the 2016 presidential election. 

While Democrats had some ideas on how to deal with the problems faced by the newly displaced, those ideas were blocked by the Republican Congressional Party. The Democrats have held the Presidency for 16 of the last 24 years, but have only held both houses of Congress for four of those years. Still, most people hold the President more accountable for results than the Congress.

Thus, too many on the “left” found it easier to blame voters who, in our view, did not see this political dynamic, rather than to consistently and exclusively challenge the moneyed interests and ideologues who blocked efforts to ameliorate the collateral damage caused by a changing world economic order. This failure was due, I suspect, in large part to the sharp decline in the strength of the Labor Movement and the increasing dependency of Democratic politicians on Wall Street money. So, by and large, many took refuge from the failure to soften the rough edges of American Capitalism by focusing principally on social issues. (This was a big part of the Hillary-Bernie divide during the primaries.)

In any event, the thesis that it was easier to be smug about being “right” than to fight more vigorously for the economic health of the working classes seems true. That Trump was able to end-run the Democrats with a faux concern for the newly displaced may seem outrageous, but it should not be surprising.