Building on the American Non-Trumplican Majority for Political Victory in the Future

An update for all of us who are trying to figure out what the Nov. 8 voting portends for future elections.

First, as of close of business November 22, it appears, contrary to earlier reports, that 2016 turnout (134,041,442) actually exceeded the 2012 turnout (129,085,410). That gap will be larger when the remaining votes are tabulated.

Second, Clinton, as of November 22, has received 64,500,489 votes (48.1%) to Trump's 62,371,681 (46.5%) -- a plurality of more than two million votes. In 2012, Obama received 65,915,795 (51.1%) to Romney's 60,933,504 (47.2%). We must remember that the Democratic Party won the popular vote in the last three, and in four of the last five, presidential elections.  

Third, in the seven swing states won by Trump, he received a majority of the votes in only two: Iowa (51.%) and Ohio (51.8%). And all this with a Democratic candidate who carried some significant baggage and did not carry it very well.

The electoral future can be bright. In seeking to ameliorate -- or at least call to the nation's attention -- the damage that Trump and the Congressional Republicans will cause, activists most focus principally on strategies for building on this American majority so that the Electoral College and the gerrymandered Congress can return to their normal states of reflecting majority will. This must include a coherent message that will convince the 5.4% of the electorate who could not abide Trump, but could not accept Clinton, that the 2020 candidate is worthy of full trust. And this coherent message should not back away from the Democratic Party Platform.  

Most importantly, the Democratic message must include a forceful plan, forcefully presented, to help those left behind by technological change -- the very voters in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa who voted for Obama, but did not trust Clinton.

Sources:

http://cookpolitical.com/story/10174
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.pdf (p. 5)

The Smug Style in American Liberalism: How Did We Get There?

My son Mike has been posting some very wise and perceptive pieces on Facebook. Six days ago, he pointed people to this Vox article by Emmett Reisin, entitled "The Smug Style in American Liberalism."

Here is Mike’s introduction to it:

“To my fellow liberals/progressives: Bookmark this essay, which was published back in April. Place a reminder note on your calendar for, say, a week or two from now, once the election shock has worn off and the initial anger has run its course, to read this essay in full. You won't enjoy it. It was emotionally painful for me to get through. But it's such an important reference point as we collectively begin the journey of extricating ourselves from the political crisis we now find ourselves in.”

I just read it, and I agree with most of what is said. It should be read when you have the time to read and think about it. 

I have a few additional comments:

This dynamic has been going on since the mid-1960s, when our society's attempt to grapple with our racial past came at the same time when world economic changes began to threaten the newfound stability of America's white working class. These economic changes have been accelerating with each passing decade. Our inability to deal with these economic changes led, more than anything else, to the result in the 2016 presidential election. 

While Democrats had some ideas on how to deal with the problems faced by the newly displaced, those ideas were blocked by the Republican Congressional Party. The Democrats have held the Presidency for 16 of the last 24 years, but have only held both houses of Congress for four of those years. Still, most people hold the President more accountable for results than the Congress.

Thus, too many on the “left” found it easier to blame voters who, in our view, did not see this political dynamic, rather than to consistently and exclusively challenge the moneyed interests and ideologues who blocked efforts to ameliorate the collateral damage caused by a changing world economic order. This failure was due, I suspect, in large part to the sharp decline in the strength of the Labor Movement and the increasing dependency of Democratic politicians on Wall Street money. So, by and large, many took refuge from the failure to soften the rough edges of American Capitalism by focusing principally on social issues. (This was a big part of the Hillary-Bernie divide during the primaries.)

In any event, the thesis that it was easier to be smug about being “right” than to fight more vigorously for the economic health of the working classes seems true. That Trump was able to end-run the Democrats with a faux concern for the newly displaced may seem outrageous, but it should not be surprising.